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“The Prostitution of the Russian Flag”: Privateers in Russian Admiralty Courts, 1787-1798 
 
In 1794, the Russian Empire convened the first high admiralty court for appeals to review 
petitions of merchants and privateers embroiled in the second Russian-Ottoman war of Catherine 
II’s reign (1787-1791). The Commission of Archipelago Affairs, as this admiralty court was 
called, decided over 170 cases on the basis of Russian maritime law and its interpretation of the 
law of nations concerning commercial navigation and privateers. A year into its work, the 
Commission determined that one case sat at the center of most disputes that pitted merchants 
against Russian-flagged privateers: the affair of Lambros Katsonis. The Commission’s decisions 
for most of the cases on its docket rested on its determination of Katsonis’s standing in the 
Russian Empire. Once decided, the outcome to the matter went on to define the distinction 
between Russian privateers and naval officers in Russian law – precedents that shaped Russian 
naval practices for the next fifty years. 
The Russian appellate commission’s inquiry into the legal standing of combatants 
commonly known as privateers (korsary or kapery in Russian) was not so far removed from 
similar queries in other seafaring states and empires at the time. In 1795, Georg Friedrich de 
Martens published his famous Essay on Privateers, a topic he saw as immensely relevant to the 
ongoing European maritime wars.1 With the waters around Europe and beyond sites of captures 
and reprisals, Martens saw it topical to inquire into “the origins of [...] privateers, and the laws 
subsisting with respect to them...” while recognizing that general knowledge of the law of 
nations and universal principles of Europe was not enough, and one ought to inquire into the 
“public laws and interests of every state in particular.”2 At the end of the tumultuous eighteenth 
century rife with legal disputes over prize doctrine and neutral states’ rights to commerce and 
navigation at sea in wartime, to Martens, as to his contemporaries Thomas Hartwell Horne who 
translated his essay into English and the American lawyer Henry Wheaton, a full understanding 
of the laws and practices of privateering appeared to be necessary and practical.3 To these jurists, 
as to the Russian government, the question of the legal basis of privateering seemed of central 
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concern to state policy as well as to individual practitioners of activities surrounding prize 
taking. 
The ongoing Revolutionary Wars in Europe at the time of Martens’ treatise wrought 
havoc on merchant shipping in European waters and beyond. As had been the case for most of 
the eighteenth century, privateers were still deemed to be the biggest perpetrators of maritime 
commercial violence. According to the data assembled by David J. Starkey, there were around 
1800 actual vessels commissioned in Britain in the period 1793-1815.4 The battle over commerce 
raiding continued in admiralty courts, and both the High Court of Admiralty and the U.S. Federal 
Courts often decided in favor of their nations’ privateers in prize cases.5 Devastating trade 
prospects compelled merchants to move their capital away from commercial vessels to financing 
privateers.6 If studies of British naval power suggest that by the end of the eighteenth century 
privateers played a less significant role than they had before, this had little reflection on other 
states such as Russia and the United States issuing letters of marque and relying on auxiliary 
naval forces to augment their strength at sea.7 The turbulent Spanish American revolutions in the 
1820s provided further opportunities for commerce raiding and maritime predation and the 
revolutionary governments issued letters of marque to U.S. privateers.8 
As a longtime practice of European empires, but a relatively recent one for the Russian 
Empire in the late eighteenth century, privateering offers an insight into Russian legal 
acculturation as the empire used European legal discourse to frame its practices. The study of 
privateers and admiralty courts is by no means new, but the aim of this article is to examine how 
European understandings of privateers held up to Russia’s legal scrutiny. The few studies on 
Russian engagement with the law of nations in the eighteenth century point to a successful, but 
perhaps uncritical, appropriation of standards of western international law by Russian diplomats 
and statesmen.9 The laws of maritime warfare, in particular, offer an example of a practice for 
which there were few preexisting legal antecedents in Russia; in the late eighteenth century 
privateers became a wholly new legal category in Russian naval service.10 For this reason, it is 
especially interesting to examine which aspects of Russian practice were similar to other 
European practices and which were sui generis. This article will begin with an overview of the 
historical context in which the Russian Empire first commissioned large-scale use of privateers 
and examine the legal instruments through which it sought to control them; it will then turn to 
the Commission for Archipelago Affairs, a little-known, temporary judicial and administrative 
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body that was imbued with a surprising amount of power over many lives in the Eastern 
Mediterranean; finally, it will analyze the Commission’s caseload, focusing on its central legal 
dilemma revolving around the activities of Lambros Katsonis and the social and legal 
implications of the decision in this case. 
In contrast to Western jurists who defended the legitimacy of private combatants under a 
sovereign sanction, the Russian government at the end of the eighteenth century was more 
concerned with how to differentiate privateers from other naval irregulars and the state navy. As 
moral condemnations of privateering added up, Martens and his contemporaries sought to 
demonstrate the legal legitimacy of privateers while proscribing certain actions that would render 
privateer actions as piracy.11 Drawing on a historical distinction between private and public 
warfare, Martens began his Essay by defining privateers based on their ownership of the vessel 
and a sovereign’s explicit consent for privateer activities.12 Sovereign consent came in the form 
of letters of marque or reprisals, authorizing the use of the flag as well as legal condemnation of 
a prize in an admiralty court, allowing the privateer to collect prize money from the sale of the 
prize and its cargo. Russian maritime law similarly sought to legitimize the privateers’ actions 
while insulating the government from obligations to the privateers or on their behalf. While the 
entire western legal canon seemed to take the designation of a privateer as an a priori legal 
designation stemming from a financial or legal arrangement, in Russia it was this very distinction 
that sat at the heart of the Katsonis case.13 As this article shows, the Russian Empire appropriated 
a wholly different standard for determining who was a privateer, not through ownership but 
through moral qualities. Faced with the question of whether Lambros Katsonis was a privateer, 
the Commission for Archipelago Affairs evaluated his actions based on eyewitness testimony 
and made their judgment of his moral character as the basis for its determination. It is tempting 
to attribute this difference to the old reading of Russian law as lacking the inalienability of 
private property.14 But as the discussion in the Commission for Archipelago Affairs shows, the 
idea of state and private ownership of vessels was well understood by all the participants in the 
case. On the contrary, the legal differences to which I point rested on the ethos of the combatants 
themselves and had much more to do with the ways in which the phenomenon of privateering 
under the Russian flag unfolded. 
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Russian Privateers in the Eighteenth Century 
In commissioning privateers the Russian Empire drew on a long tradition of supplementing its 
army with irregular forces, yet this specific kind of combatant had much to do with Russian 
encroachment into the Eastern Mediterranean in the late eighteenth century. In the reign of 
Catherine II (r. 1762-1796) the Russian Empire fought two wars against the Ottoman Empire, the 
first lasted from 1768 to 1774 and the second from 1787 to 1791. In both wars Russia expanded 
its legal reach into the Eastern Mediterranean by utilizing ties to Eastern Orthodox communities 
in the region. Russia’s connections with the Orthodox subjects of Ottoman and Austrian Balkan 
territories reach back centuries, and include a wide array of military, cultural, and religious 
exchanges. Individual studies have illuminated the importance of formal military and political 
ties, and their role in shaping Russian activity and politics beyond the empire’s territory.15 In 
Catherine II’s reign it was Russia’s admiralty – that is, the naval personnel, infrastructure, and 
bureaucracy – that exerted control over the fates of the Christian reaya (Ottoman tax-paying 
subjects). In advance of the 1768 war, Russian agents planted the seeds of rebellion among the 
Ottoman Orthodox populations. Agents travelled throughout Albania, the Peloponnese, and the 
Aegean Archipelago, conferring with local secular, spiritual, and military leaders about a 
coordinated rebellion timed to coincide with the arrival of the Russian naval fleet in the 
Mediterranean.16 In the 1780s, with a second war with the Ottoman Empire imminent, the 
Russian government used its newly established consular service in the Levant to recruit 
combatants and captains, and to arrange financial and political support for Russian operations 
against the Porte.17 Consuls worked with local merchants and townspeople to distribute money 
and credit to buy armaments, vessels, and provisions for combatants and skippers. Veterans of 
the 1768 war such as Antonio Psaro, Ghikas Bitsiles, and Damiam Zaguriskii occupied many of 
the consular positions throughout the region.18 Drawing on the concessions from the 1774 peace 
treaty, Russian agents sailed around the Mediterranean under commercial flags, delivering 
instructions to consuls and other sympathizers in hopes of lining up political allies.19 Finally, 
Russian propaganda played an important part in recruiting combatants. Catherine II issued 
manifestos calling for Balkan Christians to mobilize against the Ottomans in anticipation of the 
arrival of the Russian fleet, which would bring necessary armaments and provide support in the 
upcoming showdown.20 
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As the specificities of the Mediterranean region dictated some of the peculiarities of 
Russian privateering, the Russian Empire’s response to these challenges offers a new perspective 
on the geopolitical quagmire traditionally referred to as the Eastern Question. In contrast to 
numerous studies of Russian foreign policy which assert that religion or ethnicity constituted the 
ideological motivation for Russian action in Ottoman domains, I argue that many of these 
activities took place under the explicit legal sanction of the Russian Empire and within the 
framework of Russian admiralty law, which itself was based on Russia’s interpretation of the law 
of nations.21  Searching for the origins to Russian policy in the eighteenth century, scholars have 
projected assumptions about both Russian intentions and the nationalist movements of the 
nineteenth century. In fact, at the end of the eighteenth century, many of the modern stable 
political identities that were to emerge by the early twentieth century were in flux. Tensions cut 
across social lines just as much as they did across nationality and religion. Presupposing Russia’s 
affinity towards particular groups overlooks the possibility that Russian actions shaped the 
processes of national identity formation in these groups, lending political valence to particular 
social categories.22 From this perspective, international law might indeed appear to be a pretext 
for action rather than the method by which the Russian Empire extended its sovereign reach by 
means of its admiralty jurisdiction.23 This particular element of Russian sovereign power 
developed largely in the context of several Russian-Ottoman wars at the end of the eighteenth 
century, when the Russian Empire recruited large numbers of foreign subjects to serve under its 
flag and developed the legal infrastructure by which to manage them. 
From the perspective of the law of nations, Russian recruitment of privateers to sail under 
its flag mirrored the state of European law described by contemporary jurists such as Martens 
and Wheaton and historians’ accounts of French, British, and American practices. The Russian 
Empire was a recognized sovereign polity endowed with the authority to issue letters of marque, 
or patents - in Russian terminology, without prompting the questions or disputes that arose with 
North African corsairs or other polities whose sovereign status was in question.24 Nor did 
Ottoman and Habsburg subjects who accepted Russian commissions raise the same concerns 
about the legality of their status as enemy combatants as Dutch commerce raiders had in their 
rebellions against the Spanish.25 Notably, many aspects of Russian privateering were drawn from 
the British experience. In 1769, the President of the College of Foreign Affairs Nikita I. Panin 
asked the Russian special envoy in London, Ivan G. Chernyshev, to explain how the British used 
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admiralty patents, to whom they entrusted this power, and to relay other logistics of commerce 
raiding.26 The structure and proceedings of Russian prize courts, however, was more comparable 
to the French Conseil des Prises in which the commission that determined the legitimacy of prize 
vessels consisted of members appointed by the monarch.27 Much as they did in the French 
system, Russian privateers relied on consuls throughout the Mediterranean region to help equip 
their ships, recruit crews, and serve on prize commissions.28 
In common with existing European practice, the Russian Empire regulated its privateers 
through individual patents, detailed rules and instructions, and with the assistance of prize courts. 
Indeed, in Russia as elsewhere, the entire enterprise of sanctioning and controlling privateers 
relied on regulation.29 The Russian government expected its privateers to adhere to prescribed 
procedures in capturing merchant vessels, searching neutral vessels, and taking prisoners. The 
Rules for Privateers, which enumerated the standards of behavior for privateers under the 
Russian flag in twenty-seven statutes, were translated into several languages and circulated 
among the privateer captains.30 The prize court (or prize commission, in Russian parlance) 
formed the cornerstone of this system. Privateers were expected to bring captured vessels and 
cargo to the nearest neutral or allied port for a thorough examination by a prize commission, 
which would assess the legality of the capture and condemn the vessel as a good prize, allowing 
the booty to be sold at public auction and the privateer to be remunerated with nine-tenths of the 
sum received. The prize commissions were required to provide both the petitioners and 
privateers with copies of their decisions – legal record of the event, which could then form the 
basis of an appeal of a consul or commission’s decision concerning a captured prize to the 
Russian imperial court (dvor). 
These practices, fine-tuned by European empires and their admiralty courts over 
centuries, were appropriated by the Russian Empire on a large scale in its wars against the 
Ottoman Empire in the late eighteenth century. Russian activity in historically Ottoman domains 
in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Black Sea following the 1774 Treaty of Küçük-Kaynarca 
that ended the first war has been central to the narrative of Ottoman decline and a source of 
dispute in the political and diplomatic standoff between European powers in the region.31 Naval 
practices in Russian-Ottoman wars saw the evolution of Russia’s military strategy towards a 
more determined effort to attack Ottoman commerce, intercept food provisions in an effort to 
starve Constantinople, and interrupt Ottoman communications. By the 1780s, privateers acquired 
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a greater strategic value in the eyes of Russia’s military leadership. With the outbreak of the 
1787 war with the Ottoman Empire, the Russian government turned to the experience of the 
1768 war, particularly in the recruitment of irregular troops to augment its naval manpower. 
However, the aftermath of the 1768 war and developments in Russia’s policy towards 
seaborne raiding in the 1780s accounted for notable differences in the role privateers played in 
the second Russian-Ottoman war. In the intervening period, the government had taken a more 
resolute stance on the subject of neutral commerce at sea, declaring maritime trade an inviolable 
right and taking efforts to protect neutral rights.32 Russia’s interpretations of the laws regarding 
the permissibility of seizing merchant vessels or enemy cargo were codified in several pieces of 
legislation and became the cornerstone of what Russian officials referred to as the “neutral 
system.” At the same time, Russia changed its reward structure for privateers, introducing strong 
financial incentives to attract irregular combatants and reward them handsomely for their 
service.33 The sudden outbreak of a war with Sweden in the summer of 1788 kept the Baltic Sea 
fleet occupied in the north of Europe and Russian-flagged privateers were the only Russian 
armed ships in the Mediterranean during the war. Without a strong official naval presence, the 
government attempted to introduce consular oversight to regulate the privateers; but, in reality, 
the government had few tools with which to restrain the unsavory activities of these soldiers of 
fortune. 
Despite structural changes introduced in the 1787 war that marked many naval auxiliaries 
as distinct, it was still unclear who among the combatants fit the newly appropriated term 
“privateer.” True to what historian Eric Lohr has described as a “separate deal” model, Russian 
commanders recruited a variety of foreigners to serve the Russian Empire under different terms 
and contracts and by far not all naval officers pledged an oath to the Russian monarch.34 Among 
the variations of terms of service to the Russian crown were the propensity of British subjects to 
request a separate schedule for the allocation and distribution of prize money while three 
Corsican captains asked for an enlistment bonus for all recruits and a priest for their exclusively-
Corsican battalion.35 The indeterminate status of privateers vis-à-vis irregular naval troops is best 
exemplified by the government’s decision to organize the flotillas sailing around the 
Mediterranean into a coordinated force.36 The flotillas were intended to disrupt food supplies to 
Constantinople and divert at least some of the Ottoman naval forces away from the Black Sea, 
or, in Matthew Anderson’s words, to add “nuisance value.”37 One flotilla consisted of state-
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owned ships captained by Lieutenant Samuel de Chaplet of the Russian Navy. In anticipation of 
hostilities with the Ottoman Empire over Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Anton Psaro and other 
Russian agents had begun making preparations – purchasing ships and stockpiling timber – for 
Russian naval action in the region.38 Under the assumption that the Baltic fleet would soon arrive 
in the Mediterranean, as it had in the previous war, the state-owned flotilla had seemingly done 
very little before 1789. After the Swedish declaration of war in 1788 detained the Baltic fleet in 
the northern seas, Russian command placed Guglielmo Lorenzo, a corsair from Malta and one of 
at least a dozen other officers recruited into Russian service, in charge of the state-owned 
flotilla’s nine vessels.39 The second flotilla was headed by Lambros Katsonis, who had been 
terrorizing Mediterranean commerce since early 1788 and had already acquired a reputation as a 
notorious blaggard among many of the region’s officials.40 The French consul Pierre Frammery 
was one of many to express his outrage at Katsonis’s “criminal conduct” to Russian consul in 
Trieste Spiridon Varucca, likening Russian support of Katsonis’s greed to the “prostitution of the 
respectable Russian flag.”41 As we shall see below when we examine his case in greater detail, 
Katsonis began his commerce raiding operation with funds from senior government officials 
acting in a private capacity, but soon required government assistance to secure his release from 
jail and pay his debts. The government’s efforts to corral him and his men into state service 
added further ambiguity to his position in the Russian navy. 
The Commission for Archipelago Affairs 
The records of the Commission for Archipelago Affairs are the best source we have for the 
practice of Russian admiralty law in this period. Catherine II convened the Commission for the 
Affairs of the Archipelago Flotillas during the War with Turkey [sic] (Kommissiia po delam 
Arkhipelagskoi Flotilii v voinu s Turtsiei) -- hereafter the Commission for Archipelago Affairs – 
after the end of the Russian-Ottoman war, tasking it with reconciling accounts and investigating 
the activities of Russian flotillas in the Mediterranean Sea. The Rules for Privateers that guided 
Russian practice in the Eastern Mediterranean in the war called for the creation of a higher-level 
admiralty court to settle any disputes or dissatisfaction of merchants or privateers, but it was the 
flood of complaints and requests for payment, reimbursement, and restitution after the war that 
necessitated prompt action and a thorough review of Russia-sanctioned activities.42 In 1794 the 
Commission was formed under the purview of the Procurator General of the Senate (General 
Prokuror), Prince Alexander N. Samoilov. Consisting of two members of the Admiralty College 
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– Vice-Admirals Wilhelm P. von Dezin (Vilim Fondezin, also spelled von Dessen) and Efim I. 
Lupandin – and two from the Department of Government Revenues – Ivan A. Naryshkin and 
Karl F. Moderakh – it then operated until 1798.43 As Catherine herself noted, “keeping the 
flotillas in the Mediterranean Sea in the latest war against Turkey [sic] was both costly and 
troublesome” for Russia.44 Indeed, the costs were not only financial but also political. 
Instructions given to the Commission offered little by way of guidance, but the emphasis 
on procedure, evidence, and validity suggests the importance of the veneer of legality to the 
Commission’s proceedings. The Commission was instructed to “rule on” the grievances 
presented before them “with due process” and to present to Catherine “those what were shown to 
be valid.”45 The cases were adjudicated according to the Rules for Privateers and, where 
appropriate, the Naval Statute of 1720. But the Commission’s understanding of the sources of 
autocratic law extended beyond laws and edicts issued by the monarch; the Commission 
evaluated orders and instructions from the monarch and military superiors as sources of Russian 
law.46 Dispatches from senior military officials such as Vice-Admiral Samuel Gibbs and 
Lieutenant-General Ivan Zaborovskii to their subordinates were treated by the Commission as 
legally-binding instructions. As others have shown, this emphasis on legal process was fairly 
typical of Catherine II’s reign.47 But unlike domestic legal initiatives from the Legislative 
Commission to the equity courts, which had mixed results, the Commission for Archipelago 
Affairs proved successful in establishing itself as a credible adjudicator of petitions and claims 
within its jurisdiction.48 It was a felicitous example of Russia’s practice of law-based 
governance. 
As an institution, the Commission for Archipelago Affairs presented a unique example of 
Russian legal practice that drew on international norms and sought to make its decisions 
comprehensible to foreign observers. The Commission’s membership and mandate reflected the 
dual juridical and administrative roles of the Russian bureaucracy, with each case’s successful 
resolution requiring the Commission both to rule on legal questions and calculate the sums owed 
the petitioner. The procedure – a written inquisition, rather than an adversarial trial – also made 
the format of this prize court different from British and American admiralty courts. On the other 
hand, while petitions to the Commission were submitted separately, the Commission for 
Archipelago Affairs considered the cases together – as distinct pieces of a bigger whole (and as 
costly line items in the budget of the war). The records of the Commission, particularly its 
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opinions and case summaries, contain annotations referencing other claims simultaneously under 
consideration. The Commission cross-referenced and applied evidence and decisions from one 
case to another, demonstrating how proceedings influenced their reasoning in a particular case. 
By this method, the Commission identified important legal questions that required resolution 
before it could proceed to the mundane details of calculating and apportioning prize shares and 
restitution claims. Meanwhile, the Commission’s guiding legislation was the Rules for 
Privateers, which contained commonly accepted practices among European powers such as the 
adherence to a prize court’s judgment, relying on flags to determine nationality of a vessel, and 
commonly accepted definitions of contraband. The Rules likewise upheld Russia’s vision of the 
protection of neutral rights in maritime warfare, a position Catherine II claimed was consistent 
with the law of nations. As a piece of legislation governing Russian actions, the Rules were 
widely circulated in many languages throughout the Eastern Mediterranean region.49 The 
contents of the Rules and the principles behind them were likely well known throughout the 
region as plaintiffs regularly referenced them in their petitions. While a Russian institution, the 
Commission was therefore both accessible to foreign petitioners or consuls acting on their 
behalf, and decided its cases in accordance with international norms. 
Although it was intended as a higher-level prize court, the Commission oversaw a wide 
range of cases. Many of the records concerning the activities of Russian privateers in the 
Mediterranean are preserved in Fond 150 of the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Voenno-
Morskogo Flota [Russian State Naval Archive]. However, these were not the only records 
pertaining to privateer activity in the Mediterranean; other complains and requests bypassed the 
Commission and ended up in the personal cabinet of Catherine II or one of her secretaries.50 
Some of the Commission’s files have been lost over the years, and others have been spliced 
together for efficiency. Today there are 141 discrete files, containing about 171 different 
complaints. Over one hundred of the dela (cases) handled by the Commission were linked to the 
activities of Lambros Katsonis. Of these, roughly half came from combatants on his flotilla 
(some petitions represented as many as seventy crewmembers), and the other half were 
complaints from creditors and merchants who sought reimbursement of their expenses or 
restitution of their property. Still, this division is more arbitrary than representative of any 
significant differences between the cases that were being decided.  
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With the exception of passing mentions in the few studies of Russia’s privateers, the 
central role of the Commission for Archipelago Affairs in the aftermath of the 1787 war and in 
Russian legal history remains largely unexamined in scholarly literature.51 For most historians, 
the Commission’s role in analyzing the legalities and apportioning costs for privateer activities 
generally held little interest, although several popular monographs valorize their military 
accomplishments.52 At the same time, jurists and legal historians have noted the existence of 
various pieces of legislation but never the application of the laws. My research into the cases 
overseen by the Commission for Archipelago Affairs demonstrates its central role in resolving 
the many various disputes that arose after the 1787 Russian-Ottoman War. What follows is a 
discussion of the central issue in front of the Commission – the legal status of Lambros Katsonis 
and the combatants who fought alongside him for the Russian Empire – as well as the 
implications of that decision for merchants from the Eastern Mediterranean. Together, they 
reflect the procedure of the Russian admiralty courts, the values that underlay its decisions, and 
the surprising amount of authority wielded by this Commission. They highlight the legal tensions 
that in Russia’s foreign policy, which had been previously discounted or overlooked in a broader 
narrative of the Eastern Question. Although seldom portrayed in this way by historians, prize 
courts constituted notable elements of Russia’s foreign policy practice and responsible for the 
adoption of international norms in this period and subsequently.53 
The War According to Katsonis 
The petitions submitted by combatants from Lambros Katsonis’s flotilla constituted roughly one-
third of the Commission’s caseload, allowing it to consider the general principles underlying the 
officers’ requests. With some variation, the privateers all made the same claims. They presented 
a short biography, service career, and rank, and detailed their achievements in service and their 
loyalty to the Russian crown. These claims were supported with any available evidence, 
including patents for rank and testaments from their commanders attesting to their bravery, valor, 
and indispensable service. These duties included fighting enemy ships, completing secret 
missions, and recruiting and financially supporting crews on their vessels. The plaintiffs, with 
some variation, sought salaries for their service, reimbursement of any personal expenses, and 
awards of prize money for themselves and their entire crews. Importantly, many requested a 
promotion in rank and a permanent placement in the imperial Black Sea fleet. Overall, the 
Julia Leikin 
 
12 
simultaneous requests for prize money as privateers and salary as officers highlights the 
ambiguity of how even irregular combatants saw their position in relation to the state. 
The most important question before the Commission was the legal status of these 
combatants. As the Commission insisted, the status of the flotilla was central to resolving other 
cases such as whether to pay salaries, prize money amounts, or reimbursements to merchants. 
The Commission issued its first decisions to hundreds of Katsonis’s crewmembers towards the 
end of 1794. In each of these cases the Commission universally denied salaries and wages to the 
petitioners on the basis that they were privateers. One typical denial read: 
As the named petitioner Major Ziguri served on Colonel Lambros Katsonis’s flotilla, which was as the facts 
of the case show organized as a privateer flotilla, and not from the treasury and which during its operations 
in searching for the enemy is not only entitled to any salary, but also the privateer must on the basis of 
Article 9 pay one-tenth to the treasury. Consequently, he is not entitled to a salary for serving under 
Lambros Katsonis in time of war, and in light of Articles 1 and 9 of the aforementioned Rules, he is not 
entitled to 2000 florins for arming the frigate Achilles.54 
The Commission’s rationale rested on a distinction that it drew between a state 
(kazennaia) flotilla and Katsonis’s private or free (vol’naia) flotilla. At first glance, the 
Commission’s decision seemed to reinforce the conventional understanding between the two, in 
which the crew of the former were entitled to wages and provisions from the Treasury, while the 
crew of the latter would be paid solely out of their prize money. However, the Commission’s 
decision not to use Treasury funds to pay Katsonis’s crew stemmed from a moral judgment of 
Katsonis and his men, rather than from a doctrinal definition of a privateer in contemporary 
international law.55 Behind the Commission’s differentiation between the two flotillas lay a more 
nuanced understanding of what constituted state service and its relationship to the common good. 
The ownership structure of the flotillas – one owned by Katsonis and the other by the 
state – went some ways towards resolving the ambiguity of their legal rights and entitlements, 
but it was not the starting point of the Commission’s reasoning but rather its direct consequence. 
The distinction was not theoretical but material, and the livelihood of hundreds hung in the 
balance. Despite the salience that ownership of private property acquired in Russia during 
Catherine’s reign, even Katsonis’s initial claims to ownership of his flotilla were not absolute.56 
Even if no procedure for expropriating private property existed in civil law, the Russian 
government had centuries of practice in mobilizing private or civilian resources for military 
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purposes. The process existed in several forms, from making contracts with merchants at 
favorable (for the government) rates for delivery of provisions or timber, to purchasing or 
requisitioning merchant ships for military use. In the Aegean archipelago in wartime, under the 
nebulous “laws of war,” Russian commanders took ships, provisions, and supplies as needed. 
When the local population provided these necessities willingly, they were reimbursed – often 
below market rate – for their property; otherwise provisions and supplies were claimed by force 
as if from enemy populations. The Russian government even reserved its right to employ its 
privateers in a military capacity in Article 22 of the Rules for Privateers. State need in wartime, 
legitimated by most political theories, expressed itself in the expropriation of merchant and 
private naval vessels for state wars in England and France just as much as in Russia. In the eyes 
of the Russian service elite of the late eighteenth century, morality and public service to the 
Russian Empire demanded personal sacrifice.57 Nikolai S. Mordvinov, who later emerged as a 
liberal in absolute defense of property rights, freely recognized the government’s right to 
requisition Katsonis’s flotilla (which Mordvinov saw as his own) for state use in the middle of 
the 1787 Russian-Ottoman War.58 
The Commission recognized the confusion over the indeterminable legal status of 
Katsonis’s flotilla in the many requests that poured in from Katsonis’s officers and sailors who 
asked to receive wages, table money, and expenses for their service to the Russian state. In 1789, 
when the government attempted to organize the privateer flotillas sailing around the 
Mediterranean into a united force, Katsonis received orders to set out as head of an “imperial 
Russian flotilla.”59 The government’s efforts to reorganize the flotillas and Katsonis’s new orders 
have been interpreted by historians as a change in Katsonis’s legal status.60 But the idea that 
Katsonis’s status changed from “privateer” to “Russian officer” came from Katsonis himself. 
Sensing the government’s need for his services, he had apparently let the government’s favor go 
to his head. Refusing to follow instructions given to him by Zaborovskii and Gibbs, Katsonis 
boasted “he was in charge and dependent on no one.” Katsonsis’s insistence that he was no 
longer a privateer, but rather the head of an imperial Russian squadron robbed Gibbs of means to 
restrain him. “Perhaps he has secret orders that he has not shared with me,” he surmised.61 
Katsonis’s posturing as a Russian officer inclined potential would-be privateers to join his flotilla 
and creditors to lend him large sums. As later claimed in their appeals to the Commission, they 
truly believed that they were dealing with an agent of the Russian government. For example, in 
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his letters to the Commission, Lorenzo Aleandri, a captain who had previously served under the 
Guglielmo Lorenzi in the state flotilla, explained that Katsonis presented himself as a Russian 
officer, had a patent, and flew not a privateering flag but a naval ensign.62 Katsonis’s 
misrepresentation of his status was likely at the root of the many requests for salaries which his 
former crew submitted to the Russian government as well as the similarity in the language and 
arguments the petitioners presented. Evidently, the Commission was confused as well, but 
ultimately relied on testimony provided by commanders in the field to determine that Katsonis 
and his crew were privateers, as reflected in the Commission’s 1794 decisions. Vasilii S. 
Tomara’s memorandum on the course of events in the Archipelago, written shortly after the 
Treaty of Jassy was signed in 1792, supported the legal distinction between the two flotillas.63 
Even Zaborovskii, whose instructions were the source of Katsonis’s claims to be an officer, 
clarified that he considered Katsonis a privateer, underscoring that the money paid by the 
Treasury for his vessels and his debts was intended to be repaid by Katsonis from the prizes he 
captured.64 
In 1795, in a letter presented to the Commission by Count Platon A. Zubov, Catherine’s 
young favorite, Lambros Katsonis disputed the Commission’s findings that his flotilla “must be 
considered a privateer flotilla by law.” He expressed “great regret” at learning of the 
Commission’s denial of his crew’s petitions to be paid for their service. Katsonis drew a 
distinction – the same distinction that was later emphasized to the Commission by the General 
Procurator and Catherine II – that until Zaborovskii’s arrival in Italy in early 1789, he was 
indeed a privateer.65 However, after he was given Zaborovskii’s instructions, he acted solely with 
military purpose. Katsonis claimed that Zaborovskii’s instructions transformed him from a 
privateer into an officer, articulating what he saw to be the differences between privateers and 
state war vessels in support of this view. He emphasized this difference with his understanding of 
what distinguished a privateer from a military vessel: “I fought not against merchant, but military 
enemy vessels and even ships of the line, where I earned nothing except cannonballs, bullets, and 
the loss of my vessels.”66 Katsonis understood what the Russian government had, perhaps, been 
reluctant to recognize: that a privateer’s aims differed from a country’s strategic goals. He 
emphasized this distinction further by pointing out that were he “only a privateer,” he would 
have no reason to operate in his assigned location or coordinate with the captain of another 
flotilla (that is, Lorenzi). On the contrary, he speculated that as a privateer he would cruise in 
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more financially lucrative places. Katsonis’s second line of argument drew a distinction between 
military and privateer organization and obligation, where privateers did not receive military 
ranks and did not find themselves obliged to fit out vessels for the navy nor send reports of their 
battles to commanders. Nor would he be implicated in political intrigues, or have to surrender his 
prizes for political purposes.67 Finally, he complained, that Russian officials treated his flotilla 
not as his private flotilla, but as one belonging to the state, in that they had sold off some of its 
vessels and transferred the rest to the Black Sea fleet. 
Katsonis’s arguments gained traction with the monarch herself, and in light of his 
assertions to be a Russian officer, the Commission was instructed to reassess its previous 
decisions with a new periodization of the flotilla’s activities. The flotilla’s activities were 
reclassified into three phases, each of different legal standing: in 1788, they were privateers; 
from 1789 until the ceasefire in 1791, they were in state service; after the peace, Katsonis acted 
without government authority.68 In contravention of this instruction, the Commission determined 
on 21 June 1795 that Katsonis’s claims that his flotilla had been appropriated by the Treasury 
was “entirely incorrect” (est’ sovsem ne spravedlivo).69 In their next report, the Commission 
addressed all of the warrants that Katsonis provided in support of his claims to be a Russian 
officer. Most cleverly, they invoked Article 22 of the Rules for Privateers, which anticipated the 
need for privateers to cooperate with the Russian navy as part of the service that all privateers 
owed to the Russian crown for authorizing their activities. In the Commission’s interpretation of 
Article 22, Zaborovskii had every right to issue instructions to Katsonis as he was acting on Her 
Imperial Majesty’s wishes and instructions. This broad power gave the Russian navy the right to 
determine the location for Katsonis’s activities (which, they claimed, was the most profitable for 
intercepting Ottoman vessels without competition from corsairs from Malta and Sardinia). In 
response to Katsonis’s other arguments about his obligations to report to superiors or coordinate 
with other flotillas, the Commission deferred to testimony from Major-General Psaro, Gibbs, and 
Tomara, which stated that Katsonis had never followed through on instructions to coordinate or 
connect with Lorenzi’s flotilla, or any of the other orders issued to him by Gibbs, head of flotilla 
activities in the Mediterranean. In short, the Commission decided that Zaborovskii’s orders were 
anticipated by several of the articles in the Rules for Privateers and, as a result, it stood by its 
decision of considering Katsonis a privateer throughout the 1787 war with the Ottoman Empire. 
Julia Leikin 
 
16 
These conclusions, the Commission further declared, obviated any need for reassessment of its 
decisions in its previous cases.70 
On the basis of its earlier decision that he was a privateer, the Commission decided that 
the State Treasury would not be responsible for Katsonis’s numerous debts.71 More 
extraordinarily still, the Commission upheld its decision after being rebuked by the Procurator 
General and the monarch for a second time and asked to reevaluate its decision once more.72 In 
its second response, the Commission emphasized that it based the decision on Russian law and 
on the testimony of the highest commanders of the Russian forces in the Archipelago during the 
war.73 
The Commission’s findings spoke directly to the extant ambiguity between naval 
auxiliaries and privateers in their relationship to the Russian state. Although they operated 
outside of the regular structure of the armed forces, irregular troops had nevertheless been 
considered part of Russia’s armed forces. They often operated under Russian commanders, and 
despite some variations, the treasury paid their salaries and provided them with ordinance and 
uniforms. Regardless of their special status or autonomy within the empire, in battle they 
contributed to the perception of Russia’s conduct of war.74 But drawing a legal and conceptual 
division between irregular, state-financed combatants and privateers allowed the government to 
distance itself from privateers’ unpalatable practices. After the ceasefire with the Ottoman 
Empire in 1791, the value of this distinction became even more relevant. In a conference with the 
Reis Effendi (the Ottoman Foreign Minister), Aleksandr Khvostov the Russian Chargé 
d’Affaires in Constantinople was put on the spot when he was asked to explain Lambros 
Katsonis’s continued predations on Ottoman commerce in the early months of 1792. As a 
transcript of the conversation suggests, Khvostov was unsure how to answer for Katsonis’s 
actions until he was able confer with St. Petersburg as to whether Katsonsis’s commerce raiding 
was authorized. He stalled for time by insisting that, to his knowledge, there were no Russian 
ships of war remaining in the Mediterranean. This distinction proved important, as the Reis 
Effendi sought confirmation from Khvostov that Katsonis’s actions were in no way supported by 
the Russian government. 75 The Reis Effendi asserted the Porte’s rights to protect its waters and 
subjects against piracy – a right upon which Russia would also insist, he postulated.  In response, 
Khvostov urged the Reis Effendi to “preserve the honor and integrity of the Russian flag” by not 
preying on Russian merchant ships in the Mediterranean. By the end of the conversation, 
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Khvostov conceded that there were no more authorized Russian vessels in the Mediterranean and 
the Ottoman Empire was free to use any means necessary to stop Katsonis.76 Khvostov’s 
insistence was affirmed by Catherine’s instructions to the Commission that disavowed 
Katsonis’s flotilla, stating that after the ceasefire it no longer had any legal standing under the 
protection of the Russian flag.77 
The Commission’s deliberations and justifications for their decision went to the heart of 
the question of whether privateer activities demonstrated commitment to state service. On the 
moral map of the eighteenth-century Russian service nobility, state service was a calling, 
military rank an honor, and soldiers were zealous servicemen. Shirking service or duty, as 
testimony from other officers showed Katsonis to have done, robbed Katsonis of moral virtue.78 
Even plunder taken in war carried a certain moral stigma.79 Although these were idealized 
values, how could the Commission – comprised of several high-ranking civil and military 
members of the service nobility – recognize Katsonis as one of their own? Their decision looked 
to Katsonis’s own actions to reject his claim that he was a Russian officer. By defining him as a 
privateer, they explained how he could be acting in a semi-military capacity under a Russian 
mandate but not in accordance to Russian orders or in the spirit of Russian officers. The 
Commission’s reasoning articulated a conceptual understanding of how privateers differed from 
the state navy. The decision recognized that privateers’ activities may coincide with state 
interests, but their adherence and execution of the values that stood behind state interest – the 
common good – mattered too.80 
The distinction between the flotillas’ status in the eighteenth century was more than a 
question of ownership. It hinged on a judgment of the combatants’ motivation. As legal 
articulations of a public or common good were still in their infancy,  the Commission’s judgment 
rested on what it deemed to be the underlying purpose of Katsonis’s activities.81 Only a few days 
after it upheld its ruling, the Commission’s reasoning was accepted by the new emperor Paul and 
his new Procurator General of the Senate, Alexander B. Kurakin.82 
The Consequences of the Katsonis Verdict 
For privateers 
The Commission’s decision in the Katsonis case made the privateers’ requests for prize money to 
be paid to them all the more relevant and urgent as they could no longer count on state salaries or 
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reimbursements. Whatever skepticism existed about Katsonis’s role as an officer, it did not 
extend to the Commission’s approbation of the role privateers played in the most recent Russian-
Ottoman war. The government’s commitment to commending and rewarding privateers was 
evident from the Commission’s willingness to overlook lapses in protocol and missed deadlines. 
Major Spiro Caliga, for instance, submitted his papers to the Commission eight months after the 
advertised deadline. When the Commission balked at reviewing the claim, the Procurator 
General urged them to proceed with the case and address the substance of Caliga’s requests.83 
Since the privateers operated as a flotilla rather than as individual vessels, their respective 
captains submitted demands for each of the prizes each flotilla captured. Guglielmo Lorenzi’s 
prize money fell outside the scope of this Commission and was instead administered by 
Catherine II’s secretary, Vasilii S. Popov. We can only speculate about the reasons for this 
alternative venue, but it is likely that fewer of the prizes Lorenzi captured were contested by their 
original owners. More significantly, Lorenzi had reported to the prize commission in Syracuse 
with his catches, where the vessels and cargo were reviewed, condemned, and sold.84 But it was 
Katsonis who demanded the largest prize sums and rewards from the Commission. That Katsonis 
frequently flouted procedure of the prize courts did not seem to prevent the Commission from 
evaluating his claims even while in other instances violations of protocol had changed outcomes 
of cases. The Commission spent the better part of the year 1797 calculating the sums owed to 
Katsonis and his crew, eventually arriving at a figure of nearly 600,000 rubles. It should be noted 
that the money was intended not for Katsonis alone, but given to him to satisfy his creditors and 
distribute among his crew of several hundred.85 
The government’s commitment to rewarding its privateers was also evident in the 
charitable interpretation of the evidence Katsonis provided to support his claims to large rewards. 
Ultimately, the main source for Katsonis’s claims was his own testimony of his successes in the 
battlefield, while much of the corroborating evidence - such as his ship log, ownership papers, 
and even many of the ships he claimed to have captured - was conveniently destroyed in his final 
skirmish with the Ottoman navy.86 His largest score was the capture of the island of Zea [Kea] 
and its fortress, which he claimed to have done in compliance with a secret order from the 
deceased Prince Grigorii A. Potëmkin-Tavricheskii. While the Commission recognized that 
Katsonis could prove neither the provenance of the order nor verify his extended presence on the 
island, it considered correspondence addressed to Katsonis on the island of Kea and subsequent 
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mission instructions to sail from the island as substantiation of his presence on Kea. From this, 
the Commission reasoned that if Katsonis had been on the island, then he must have needed to 
take certain measures to secure it and defend his crew. From this deduction, the Commission 
validated Katsonis’s request for reimbursement for the fortifications he built on the island. 
Following this pattern of reasoning, the Commission recognized the validity of Potëmkin’s oral 
instructions.87 In another instance, when determining payment for captured prisoners, the 
Commission relied on consular transactions concerning sale, ransom, and exchange of prisoners 
to come to a total of the number of persons from which it would reward Katsonis.88 The 
Commission’s willingness to accept Katsonis’s claims stands in striking contrast to the rigorous 
analysis of other petitioners’ requests for reimbursement of stolen property. Katsonis’s own 
requests were punctuated with an impressive knowledge and understanding of the law, but even 
when petitioners did not reference specific statutes in their requests the Commission drew on all 
available legislation to guide its decisions. 
For merchants 
The Commission for Archipelago Affairs also served as a forum that provided merchants with 
legal recourse in the event of capture or maltreatment by Russian-flagged privateers. Indeed, this 
function of the prize court was an important component of the government’s attempt to regulate 
the maritime violence it unleashed. The Russian government was sensitive to the impositions that 
war caused to neutral trade and was even more aware that authorizing privateers posed a 
significant risk to the Orthodox Christians sailing under Ottoman flags.89 The delicate wording of 
the Rules for Privateers was designed to avoid these molestations, but the Russian government 
nevertheless foresaw the need for additional mechanisms to satisfy aggrieved merchants. 
Merchant complaints travelled through several channels and by no means did all of them end up 
in front of the Commission.90 Many merchants submitted complaints to their countries’ consular 
representatives, who in turn complained to Russian officials posted around the Mediterranean. 
Eventually, word of these assaults reached Vice-Admiral Gibbs, who found himself powerless to 
compel Katsonis to return unlawfully seized property.91 Outstanding grievances then reached the 
Commission for Archipelago Affairs after the end of the war, and the Commission had the 
authority to recognize illegally taken prizes and compel restitution or reimbursement. A Greek 
merchant from Livorno, for example, who showed that he had been captured in 1792, after the 
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end of the war, was able to successfully recoup most of his losses from the illegal capture by 
filing a case with the Commission.92 
The biggest problem for the merchants in recouping their losses, however, was that in 
many cases the property they sought to have returned or compensated had not been taken by 
force. The Commission received numerous complaints from merchants, townspeople, and 
businessmen who had supplied the Russian flotillas with armaments, cash for provisions and 
supplies, crewmembers, loans and credit, bespoke dishes and barrels, and other high-cost items.93 
There were dozens of complaints from merchants from Trieste, Messina, Livorno, Zante, and 
other places claiming to have provided credit and provisions with the expectation that either 
Katsonis or the Russian government would reimburse them at the end of the war.94 In 
contravention to the promises and representations Katsonis made to his creditors, the 
Commission determined in many of these instances that it was not obliged to pay for privateers’ 
expenses. 
Although the Commission sought to distinguish between voluntary donations of money 
and supplies and seizures of these items by force, in actuality this distinction was misleading. 
The Rules forbade the capture of Christian vessels or property, a law to which numerous 
petitions pointed to when protesting the seizure of friendly nations’ vessels and cargo, and one 
which the Commission upheld.95 Certainly, many were willing to supply Russian combatants in 
the battle against the Ottoman Empire. However, others who wished to provide food or supplies 
feared Ottoman retribution for their assistance to the Russian forces. Captain Stepan P. 
Khmetevskii reported in his memoirs that sympathetic farmers often urged Russian forces to 
pretend to take provisions and livestock by force.96 In other cases, privateers paid merchants and 
farmers for the produce and livestock they took, or offered a letter of credit. But as Lambros 
Katsonis’s testimony to the Commission in response to an accusation of theft shows, Katsonis 
considered taking property from Ottoman subjects or on Ottoman territories as legal under the 
laws of war. The Commission upheld his reasoning, refusing payment for any property that was 
claimed by Russian irregulars by right of war.97 Katsonis’s actions suggest that merchants who 
did not voluntarily provision the troops might have their property seized anyway under a 
perfectly legal pretext.98 
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In contrast, merchants who gave Katsonis or his captains money, loans, or supplies 
received a passport that allegedly protected them from further searches or seizures by Russian-
flagged privateers for the remainder of the war. As the Commission’s records show, many 
merchants were willing to extend credit to the privateer flotillas for a variety of reasons. Chief 
among them was the perceived credibility of the investment, as they were led to believe that by 
dealing with Katsonis they were dealing with the Russian government. Katsonis’s credibility as 
an agent of the Russian government was only increased by his assumed power to distribute 
patents to privateers and travel passports to merchants. As a result, more than a few merchants 
found themselves disappointed by the Commission’s final decisions. 
Russian Maritime Law After Katsonis 
Within the confines of bureaucracy and procedure, which at times restrained the decisions of the 
Commission of Archipelago Affairs, many have suggested that achieving justice or fairness was 
an impossible task. Still, the Russian government empowered this appellate-level admiralty court 
to resolve the deluge of merchant and privateer requests. In substance, if not in procedure, the 
cases were adversarial as they placed the interests of the privateers in having vessels and cargo 
condemned as prize against those of the merchants seeking restitution for their property. The true 
significance of these cases was that even though neither side could be truly satisfied, the turn to 
Russia’s admiralty courts gave the courts legitimacy and reaffirmed their credibility as arbiters of 
disputes. Whichever side of the prize case they fell on, Ottoman subjects flocked to Russian 
admiralty courts, creating the conditions of and adding to the perception of encroachment on 
Ottoman sovereignty that lay at the heart of the Eastern Question. 
Russia’s active use of the law of nations as a basis for its relationships with the denizens 
of the Eastern Mediterranean provides new insight into the Russian-Ottoman confrontation. Most 
analyses of these relationships look to Articles VII and XIV of the 1774 Treaty of Küçük-
Kaynarca, the interpretation of which by the middle of the nineteenth century mutated into 
claims of protection over all Christians in the Ottoman Empire.99 However, this bilateral treaty 
was not the only basis for Russia’s relationship with Orthodox Christian communities in the 
Ottoman Empire. Other international norms provided a legal basis for this relationship. And the 
relationship was not unidirectional. Appeals by Ottoman subjects, former Ottoman subjects, and 
other mariners in the Mediterranean to the Russian government for a legal recourse made a 
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powerful statement about the legitimacy of legal institutions and the search for justice through 
the Russian Empire. Many privateers sought out the Russian legal system to reward them for 
their service and many aggrieved merchants went directly to the Russian admiralty courts to seek 
restitution for their property. Although Russian admiralty courts, at times, made decisions which 
weighed against Russia’s short-term or financial interests, it is notable that Russia’s admiralty 
courts became a central mechanism by which individuals and groups asserted their interests and 
received legal standing irrespective of the outcome. The cases in front of the Commission 
reflected different conflicts evident in the Mediterranean – conflicts that did not always fall 
across national and religious lines, but rather across social or socioeconomic lines. It is fitting 
that the Russian Admiralty Commission should have been called upon to resolve these tensions 
as it was Russia’s maritime legal politics that created them in the first place. 
The Commission for Archipelago Affairs established important precedents for the 
practice of Russian admiralty law. The ambiguity of Katsonis’s standing in Russian service 
compelled the commission to confront (and accept) certain realities in commissioning privateers. 
For one thing, the Russian admiralty no longer seemed conflicted about their motivations. 
Having decided that a privateer’s status had more to do with his financial motivations than the 
relationship to the state, the Russian commission elided the debates in other parts of Europe 
about the morality of privateering.100 In 1854, when moral outrage combined with political 
expediency to compel the first international agreements to abolish privateering, the Russian navy 
looked to its previous experiences with Katsonis and other privateers in an effort to organize new 
fleets to assist with commerce raiding in the Crimean War.101 Russian consular officials and 
naval commanders recruited privateers in naval campaigns throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century, but to my knowledge none of these recruits were Russian subjects. In fact, in 
response to a proposal at the height of the Napoleonic Wars to permit Russian subjects to sail as 
privateers, the Admiralty College vetoed the proposal.102 Privateers recruited in the 1806-1807 
Mediterranean campaign received less favorable prize payouts than the privateers of the 1787 
war received. Naval officers, on the other hand, saw their financial prospects from seizing 
merchant ships improve dramatically in 1806 with the passage of a new comprehensive prize 
law. 
The decisions of the Commission for Archipelago Affairs demonstrate the difficulties of 
using European conventions of prize law to understand Russian practice of privateering. 
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Adopting common European practices required reconciliation with Russian laws and practices 
more than those who see international law as universal would have us believe. The imperial 
Russian jurist Fedor F. Martens believed international law to be an essential component of 
Russia’s Europeanization.103 Like other theoreticians and practitioners of international law in the 
late nineteenth-century, Martens saw international law as a civilizing process, comparable to that 
which Russia had undergone through the forceful will of Peter the Great.104 Martens’ view of 
Russian sovereigns’ willing engagement with ideas of the law of nations is at odds with much 
recent scholarship on the relationship between imperialism and the development of modern 
international law. The third-world critique of international law, for instance, demonstrates the 
inherent unevenness and biased categories within which international law operates, challenging 
the anodyne view of international law among its first proponents and many practitioners today.105 
But what of states like Russia that willingly engaged in a legal discourse with Europe to better 
and secure their positions in international society? Whatever the role of law inside Russia, the 
empire used European legal norms to empower its subjects and institutions. It tried to protect 
these principles by encoding them in its own legislation and upheld them in its own legal system. 
Russian elites perpetuated these ideas and spread them to new geographic locales. Through their 
application to international legal norms, both the empire’s elites and its subjects showed that they 
understood the malleability of these norms and their power to advance their own interests. 
Whatever the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century foreign observers wrote of Russia’s legal 
institutions, through its practices the Russian Empire demonstrated that it understood much about 
the European law of nations and its advantages in helping Russia achieve its imperial aims. 
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